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JOSEPH G. HORNIK
DOUGLAS MCKENZIE
Grand Valley State University
This article notes the difficulty in defining cyberterrorism and several problems associated
with identifying the potential misuses of the Internet and the World Wide Web by terrorist
groups. In particular, the use of digital steganography has recently been identified as an
emerging and alarming trend by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. This technolog-
ical innovation is used as a case study of the complexities surrounding cyberterrorism, its
definition, and how democracies can deal with these advances in communication technol-
ogy. Supplementing this discussion is a review of the various social, regulatory, and legal
forms of social intervention related to controlling electronic communications. The conclu-
sion of this article includes an analytical framework from which additional research into
these issues could be conducted and suggests how policy solutions for said complexities
could be formulated.
Terrorism, let alone cyberterrorism, is a very difficult subject to understand.
As with the Internet itself, when one approaches any semblance of an intellectu-
ally satisfying level of analytical rigor, the subject metamorphoses, thus negat-
ing efforts at objectively defining or understanding it. We wrestle with this
dilemma by offering some historical perspective on the subject and logically fol-
lowing that discussion with a case study of steganography, an emerging technol-
ogy that challenges what has been defined as cyberterrorism. The inclusion of
specific historical and technical details on steganography, a form of encryption
that has recently been used by terrorist groups, is offered as evidence for the
potential use of technological developments by terrorists.
Thereafter, a discussion is included that addresses the various social, regula-
tory, and legal forms of social control related to Internet communications. As
evidenced by the discussion of steganography, the Internet revolution has cre-
ated unique challenges for law enforcement and counterterrorism professionals
using a legalistic approach to stopping political violence. These authorities are
having a difficult time adapting to the rapid pace of change and the evolving
applications of technology to new and unaddressed forms of illegality. This
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discussion will offer a brief examination of several existing attempts at social
control of this technology while being mindful of the gap in attempts at control-
ling these developments.
Although no specific solutions to the myriad uses of the Internet are offered,
the conclusion of this article includes an analytical framework from which addi-
tional research could be conducted. The hope is that this will provide a basis for
further analysis of the impact of the Internet on the world of terrorism studies
and thus in some small part facilitate effective counterterrorism policy.
DEFINING CYBERTERRORISM
Traditionally, the mere definition of terrorism, let alone a widely accepted
operational definition, has confounded scholars and provided fodder for critics
of terrorism studies (Dreyfuss, 2000; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Schmid, 1988;
Wieviorka, 1988). The reasons for this definitional dilemma vary and provide
debate silage to numerous researchers (Cooper, 1978; Lesser, Hoffman, Arquilla,
Ronfeldt, & Zanini, 1999). To summarize the debates, it is imperative to note
that no single or globally accepted definition of terrorism exists. Many critics
feel that the act of defining what constitutes an act of terrorism is as political as
the actions being categorized. Thus, even the simple act of agreeing on a defini-
tion has been politicized and resulted in alternative methods of tracking these
activities. As a result, scholars have attempted to move beyond the politically
charged confines of a definitional approach and toward schemes classifying ter-
rorism into tactics, motives, and variables associated with the perpetrators. In
doing so, they have adapted, sometimes successfully, various strategies to pro-
vide a semblance of order to the ever changing tactics used by proponents of
political violence and the situations to which the pejorative label of terrorism
has been applied.
Although many acts of terrorism have transpired over the years, and govern-
ments have been forced to address the issues brought to the fore by purveyors of
political violence, the systematic study of terrorism has been a fairly recent phe-
nomenon. Still, campaigns of terror or of violent political protest, as well as the
associated literature surrounding these topics, are not new. For example, starting
around 1850, the anarchist movement was linked to radical political change,
although in its early incarnations, it was conceived of as a nonviolent movement.
Early anarchist philosophers such as Pierre J. Proudhon were more apt to speak
of the virtues of radical, decentralized democracy and did not necessarily preach
the violent overthrow of existing governments (Woodcock, 1956). Those anar-
chists who followed in the footsteps of Proudhon would eventually become dis-
illusioned with this passive tactic of political change and ultimately turn to more
violent forms of protest.
Tangential to this alteration in anarchist philosophy was Alfred Nobel’s tam-
ing of the volatile explosive nitroglycerin and the patenting in 1867 of this
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invention as dynamite (Nobel Foundation, 1972). This explosive would become
the weapon of choice for many terrorists, including many post-Proudhon anar-
chists. Johan Most, a German immigrant to the United States, is a prime exam-
ple. Most published an anarchist-inspired newspaper and advocated the use of
this technological development when he noted that his followers should press
their cause by using the “philosophy of the bomb” (White, 1998, p. 156). This
tactic and level of technological sophistication by terrorists is still considered
the norm today. Thus, historically and contemporarily, bombings are by far the
most popular terrorist tactic used by proponents of political violence (U.S.
Department of Justice, 1998; U.S. Department of State, 2000).
Given this legacy, definitions of terrorism have evolved gradually over time.
Historically, the most influential study of terrorism that used tactics as one basis
of analysis was the RAND Chronology of Terrorism Incidents (Hoffman, 1998;
Hoffman & Hoffman, 1996). The research motivations behind RAND’s efforts
were to facilitate the collection of objective information on the extent of the
problem of political violence and to shy away from the partisan debates sur-
rounding the politically subjective definition of terrorism.1
Although the complete range of definitional deliberations are beyond this
article, suffice it to say that the debates on what constitutes and defines terrorism
are a case study in labeling theory. If one imagines a terrorist as a violator of
social norms, or at least the treatment by society of anyone labeled a terrorist as
being couched in similar terms, it is easy to imagine the negative consequences
of the label, as cautioned by Thrasher (1936), or to see the social process of dra-
matizing terrorists’ evil, as noted by Tannenbaum (1938). Likewise, Lemert’s
(1951) idea of primary and secondary deviance can be applied to campaigns of
political violence. Lastly, Becker’s (1973) belief that deviance is created by rule
makers who are reacting to the actions of the more powerless in society is sup-
ported by the critics of terrorism studies. These criticisms give recognition to the
process whereby societies use self-motivated definitions of what constitutes a
single act or a campaign of political violence to maintain existing relations of
power.
Such an application of social scientific theory to the analysis of terrorism is
rare and not the tactic that many scholars have pursued in recent years. The pri-
mary way of defining terrorism has become legalistic (Ballard, 2000; Mullendore
& White, 1996; U.S. Department of Justice, 1998). The most widely accepted
definition of reality reflecting this approach is that used by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), which notes “terrorists represent a small criminal minority
in any larger social context” (U.S. Department of Justice, 1995, p. iii). While cit-
ing various statutes and guidelines as the legal authority for its investigations,
the FBI also indicates a separation between domestic and international acts of
political violence. Additionally, the agency uses a tripartite classification sys-
tem, including incidents, suspected incidents, and preventions, to organize its
activities (U.S. Department of Justice, 1998, pp. i-ii).
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Lesser et al. (1999) identified a similar and global pattern of legalistic
response to terrorism when noting, “states were nonetheless able to reach a mea-
sure of consensuses in outlawing specific acts such as airline hijacking” (p. v).
The implication of this statement is that although governments may not readily
agree on what actions constitute terrorism or exactly who should be labeled a
terrorist, they are able to form some degree of consensus on legal responses to
specific acts and actions taken by political dissidents. This may be one of the
prime motivations for the legalistic approach to defining terrorism.
As noted, even when agencies such as the FBI define and ultimately fight ter-
rorism as a crime, they use typologies to categorize and organize actions that do
not fit the norm of acceptable political behavior. A typology is a classification
system designed to help lend some sense of order to the information under con-
sideration. The organization of politically violent behavior into typologies has a
long tradition in terrorism scholarship and has been coupled with the trend
toward using legalistic definitions (Ballard, 1997; Bell, 1978; Wilkinson, 1974).
White (1998) noted that these typologies help agencies and academics grasp
the scope and source of the problem under consideration, categorize and identify
the kinds of acts under consideration, and define what types of policy responses
are necessary to react to these types of acts. One of the most often cited criti-
cisms of typologies is that they skirt the volatile issue of how political the act of
defining terrorism is and how the label of terrorist has very real consequences
for those to whom it has been successfully been applied (Schmid, 1988).
Similarly, the literature surrounding cyberterrorism has attempted to define
this act and to identify categories that encompass the various actions that should
be considered under this label. One of the most assessable sound bites on what
defines cyberterrorism is that it is “hacking with a body count” (Collin, quoted in
Grossman, 1999). Although image invoking, this definition is not exactly usable
for more than a column inch of fodder or a quick quotation in the mainstream
media.
Attempts to more specifically define cyberterrorism have followed three gen-
eral patterns. First, a strict definition of cyberterrorism has shown up in the liter-
ature, usually predicated on one of the existing definitions of terrorism and alter-
ing that definition to account for the new medium of the Internet. One example
of this pattern combines Collin’s (1996) earlier work on what exactly constitutes
the cyberworld and the definition of terrorism used by the U.S. Department of
State (1996). The result is a hybrid definition that states, “cyber terrorism is the
premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer sys-
tems, and data which result in violence against noncombatant targets by sub
national groups and clandestine agents” (Pollitt, 2001).
The second pattern in the characterization of cyberterrorism uses existing
legal statues and authorities to define what actions constitute this crime. In a
similar process to Pollitt’s (2001) definition, Denning (2000) used existing defi-
nitions of terrorism and incorporated legalistic elements to account for cyber-
attacks.2 Thus, cyberterrorism becomes
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the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. It is generally understood to mean
unlawful [italics added] attacks and threats of attacks against computers, net-
works, and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a gov-
ernment or its people in furtherance of political and social objectives. (Denning,
2000)
The third method of signifying cyberterrorism incorporates partial elements
of the definitional attempts with accounts of specific acts or actions. To date,
these efforts are incomplete, yet they seem to mimic the propensity of counter-
terrorist professionals to classify incidents into categories that could eventually
become typologies. For example, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
stated that it focuses on “the extent to which cyber-techniques are used for espio-
nage, sabotage, or terrorism” (Bronskill, 2001, p. A3). Likewise, generalized
fears of cyberattacks are also used to try to characterize activities that could be
considered cyberterrorism. Here, the specific acts are not necessarily the focus
of concern; rather, rationales for the attacks are given. Thus, cyberterrorism is
“the intentional use of the computer to cause panic by destabilizing the U.S.
economy or playing havoc with computer data systems” (McFeatters, 2001,
p. E3). Again, these types of definitions seem to lean toward the classification of
incidents and could foreshadow the development of cyberterrorism typologies.
In a pattern similar to that of general terrorism studies, the same definitional
problems persist with respect to cyberterrorism. In fact, because of the rapid
change in technology that is part and parcel of the Internet revolution, defining
and addressing cyberterrorism offers a potentially greater challenge to scholars
and policy makers. Noting three problem areas relative to such developments
can help summarize the challenges posed to anyone wishing to define the prob-
lem or to create an analytical typology to inform the debates.
First, the operational definition of cyberterrorism changes over time. A gen-
eration in human terms may be 25 years, but in technological time, it may be
only 3 years. The challenge of rapid development in tactics is not the same for
general terrorism studies, in which for years, the most common tactic has been
bombings (Hoffman, 1998; Hoffman & Hoffman, 1996). The rapid development
and deployment of new technological innovations demand that counterterrorism
professionals looking at Internet varieties of political violence be flexible and
open to these innovations.
Second, the choices of what will be included in the definitions, or even in a
typology, are usually based on the personal perspectives of researchers. For
example, if the author of a typology is an expert on hacking, the work he or she
promotes will generally focus on varieties of this activity. By being so narrow in
its analytical focus, such a biased typology may miss a variety of relevant acts
and activities that would help policy makers and counterterrorism agencies.
Finally, research on cyberterrorism, as on terrorism in general, is not without
critics expressing legitimate concerns. An analytically rigorous definition or
typology of cyberterrorism should anticipate these criticisms. At a minimum,
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researchers should consider issues related to researcher bias, hegemonic support
for existing structures of power, the validity and reliability of the data contained
in the typology, and the lag time in recognizing technological innovations.
Although these are not the only criticisms that could be brought to bear, they rep-
resent indicators of potential areas that researchers can address in their design
activities and/or issues they should remain cognizant of when reviewing their
work as acceptable social scientific methodology.
In the end, defining cyberterrorism is an act of faith and a dedication to rea-
son. It is faith in those who make policies and laws, in the agencies dedicated to
stopping these activities, and in the power of reason over the passion of violence.
Next, a case study of a technological innovation related to cyberterrorism is pre-
sented. We argue that this is one of the issues that may arise from the mists of
technological acceleration and that could blindside counterterrorism profes-
sionals using non–critically examined definitions and/or inflexible typologies.
EMERGENT INTERNET TECHNOLOGY
Considering the definitional differences, classification ambiguities, and
inherent social stigma associated with being labeled a terrorist, one can imagine
that the technologies used by these same social actors may similarly affect the
emerging field of cyberterrorism and influence the definition of what actions
and activities constitute this form of terrorism. The following section examines
digital steganography as a case study of how technological developments chal-
lenge definitions and the analytical techniques used by counterterrorism profes-
sionals. This discussion notes that digital steganography has recently been iden-
tified by intelligence agencies as a threat and details how it can be used by
terrorist organizations to facilitate clandestine communications (Beth, Frisch,
Simmons, Goos, & Hartmanis, 1992; Brassard, 1988; Harris, 2001; Imai &
Zheng, 2000; Johnson, Duric, & Jajodia, 2000; Katzenbeisser & Petitcolas,
2000; Lam, Okamoto, & Xing, 1999; Williams, 1986).3
To examine steganography, it may be useful to note the etymology of the
word. It is derived from the Greek steganos (covered or secret) and graphy (writ-
ing or drawing). In reality, it more closely embodies the meaning of the word
stegosaur, a dinosaur of Cretaceous times that was “covered” by an armor of tri-
angular, bony plates on its spine (Currie & Padian, 1997; Glut, 1972). In today’s
electronic communications environment, steganography has come to mean a
message that contains “hidden writing” and implies that because of its techno-
logically enhanced armor, this writing is not discernible to the casual observer.
The secret writing to be hidden (message) is distributed by algorithmic
means in the file meant to contain the secret data (container). In digital
steganography, the result of the algorithmic process is saved as a separate file.
Expressed verbally,
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result file = container file + message file.
This process is not unrecognizable as similar to that used in cryptography. In
fact, cryptography and steganography are often used synonymously.4 However,
there is an important philosophical difference between the techniques. Cryptog-
raphy is the science of rendering information unreadable to others (Schneier,
1994; Schneier & Banisar, 1997). Although not readable to others, the result of
this process makes it obvious that the message contains a secret. For example,
the message “see me” is easily encrypted using a one alphabetic character shift
to the right in the array of English letters (i.e., s = t, etc.). The resultant message,
“tff nf,” will draw attention from even the most casual observer, possibly causing
the observer to attempt to decrypt the message. On the other hand, using simple
steganographic techniques, the message “see me” is hidden in the body of
another message, such as “simply enter every motor element,” by using the first
character of each word in the message. Because the container is a plausible sen-
tence, the casual observer would not necessarily suspect that the sentence is a
covert message (Petitcolas, Anderson, & Kuhn, 1998).
These definitions of cryptography and steganography suggest, rightfully so,
that a combination of the two techniques would provide added security to any-
one wishing to protect covert communications. Encrypting the data before hid-
ing it in the container file adds a “second layer” of protection, and as a result of
this convergence of technological techniques, various steganographic software
programs include tools that encrypt messages before hiding them in container
files.5
This process is essentially a procedure for hiding information from the pry-
ing eyes of an enemy, and that is not a new idea (Denning & Denning, 1998;
Kahn, 1996; Pfleeger, 1989; Seberry, 1989). Throughout history, many different
methods have been used to hide messages from enemies. These include invisible
inks, open codes, and messages in hollow shoe heels. Ancient Greek writings
refer to shaving a messenger’s head, tattooing a message directly on the scalp,
and then waiting until the hair had grown out enough to deploy the messenger.
Likewise, milk, urine, and fruit juice were used by the ancient Romans to write
between the lines of otherwise innocuous letters. During World War II, the Ger-
mans developed the microdot to hide information. A secret message was thus
reduced to the size of a period and affixed to the dot of the letter i or hidden as
other punctuation. Large amounts of printed data, including technical data, were
transmitted via microdots, and the transmission was effectively hidden (Davern
& Scott, 1995).
These methods of hiding information seem rather archaic given the transna-
tional nature of the Internet and how communications technology has changed
everyday life in the 21st century. Image and sound files are quite abundant on the
Internet, and few would suspect that the images and messages that traverse elec-
tronic freeways contain hidden messages. In particular, these images are found
on almost all Web pages and are increasingly commonly sent via e-mail. These
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developments set the stage for the potential use of steganography by those who
would expose political violence.
Applying digital steganography to a message is based on several simple prin-
ciples. The first is that the files that contain digitized images or sounds can be
altered to a certain extent without losing their functionality. The second princi-
ple rests on the inability of humans to distinguish minor changes in image color
or sound quality. This element of the steganographic transaction is especially
easy to use in objects that contain redundant information, including the common
6-bit sound file and 8-bit and 24-bit image files. For example, with respect to
images, changing the value of the least significant bit (LSB) of the pixel color
will not result in any perceivable change of that color. Likewise, sound files
could contain messages within the white noise present in most recordings.6 In
both cases, the message is hidden in the “noise” found in or introduced into com-
puterized files.
This is an important analytical point because noise is a part of everyday life,
and computerized noise is abundant. Many feel that digital communications free
messages from such noise, but the idea that digital circuits are noise free is not
necessarily true. A digital signal may be copied and recopied without changing
the original message because of the error-correcting codes and sophisticated cir-
cuitry used in the processing of messages. However, this does not eliminate the
original noise. As a result, digital photographs, digitized music, and digital vid-
eos all have significant amounts of noise left over from their creation (Wayner,
1996).
Herein lie the opportunity and the challenge for anyone wishing to hide a
message or detect these types of hidden communications. The noise found in
digital images and sounds can be used to the advantage of someone trying to
hide information. As a rule, human beings cannot detect small amounts of dis-
tortion in sounds or images. Our senses are not fine tuned enough to accomplish
this task, and small amounts of distortion in sound reproductions or in the color
pallets of pictures go unnoticed.
Although there are individualized techniques used by the various stegano-
graphic tools, the least common denominator among most tool sets is the modi-
fication of some of the LSBs of a container file’s individual bytes.7 In most
steganographic container files, the LSBs contain the modified noise or message,
which when viewed apart from the rest of the byte appear random. For example,
an 8-bit image will contain minor color differences that could pass casual
inspection, and a 24-bit image will contain color changes that are almost imper-
ceptible. These distortions in image or sound files, when interpreted with the use
of software and an access code, will recreate hidden messages at some other
time or place.8 As Davern and Scott (1995) noted, modifying the LSBs of certain
computer files would be disastrous to the integrity of the hidden data, but certain
image files can have messages hidden in them without noticeable difference.9
To demonstrate how this is accomplished, it is important to note that all com-
puter image files are composed of an array of dots called pixels. Each of these
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pixels has its own color, represented internally as specific and separate quanti-
ties of red, green, and blue, collectively known as RGB. In an eight-bit image
such as a GIF (graphics interchange format)10 or BMP (bitmap)11 file, each pixel
is described by a number from 0 to 255 that refers to an actual color in the “color
lookup table” or palette (see Table 1). For each color level, a value of 0 implies
that none of the color is present, and a value of 255 implies that the full amount of
the color is present. A pixel with an RGB value of 0,0,0 is black, and a pixel with
an RGB value of 255,255,255 is white. In the RGB model of color distribution,
there are a total of 16,777,216 (256 × 256 × 256) possible colors. Most GIF files
use only an eight-bit palette. This means that of the 16,777,216 possible colors,
only 256 RGB colors are in the image, because eight-bit binary numbers can
have only 256 distinct values.
Second, it is important to note that an image does not contain strings of bytes
that describe individual colors listed in a left-to-right, top-to-bottom order. Gen-
erally, the image itself is stored as a series of digits from 0 to 255 that reference
entries in the palette (a palette reference). An image can be thought of as a grid
with an index into the palette in each grid cell. In this way, an image can be
reconstructed by performing palette lookups to determine which color to insert
at each pixel location.
To hide data within an eight-bit GIF or BMP container, existing tools most
commonly use two techniques (“Steganography Thumbprinting,” 1998). The
first technique involves changing the LSBs of a palette reference (0 to 255) to
hide a message. A program using palette reference modification may decide
which color to point to on the basis of the color’s LSBs. The program may not
necessarily pay attention to the similarity of the colors, only to whether or not
the LSBs serve its purpose of data hiding.
The second technique involves modifying a pixel’s actual color by changing
the LSB of the red, green, or blue elements in the color table. By altering the LSB
of each color in the RGB element, a program can hide data by making almost
identical copies of colors but with slightly different LSBs. The resulting colors
are very close to the originals, and this is the point at which human perception, or
the discrepancies therein, takes over.12
GIF and BMP files have been noted in the discussion so far, but other file
types exist that represent images and sounds.13 The major difference between
file types from a layperson’s perspective is how they are compressed and decom-
pressed during actual use. Kurak and McHugh (1992) identified two types of
compression: lossless and lossy. The type of compression used to store a file is
important when selecting file types for steganography. Both of these compres-
sion methods save storage space when uploading and downloading, but the end
results may be very different when a file is uncompressed.
When it is necessary that the original information can be exactly recon-
structed, lossless compression is preferred, and steganographic container files
require that the original information remain intact for recovery of a hidden mes-
sage. This type of compression is typical in GIF and BMP images. Lossy
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compression, on the other hand, may not maintain the integrity of the original
image when it is reconstructed. JPEG14 (from Joint Photographic Experts
Group) images use this method of compression. Although there are exceptions,
most readily available steganographic software programs do not support or rec-
ommend using JPEG files because of this characteristic.
The default alternative to JPEG images is to use 256-color or gray-scale
images. In fact, GIF images of this type are prolific on the Internet. Many
authors of steganographic software stress the use of gray-scale images because
the shades of gray-scale images change gradually from byte to byte. Thus, this
type of image is a good candidate for containing a message. This suggests that
subtleties in color variation and the choice of image as the container are both
important considerations when a terrorist selects an image for steganographic
use.15
Regardless of the method used to actually hide the data, the programs used to
accomplish this task all operate basically the same way. A container image is
selected, a pass-phrase is assigned, a message is encrypted and hidden in the
container, and a result file is generated. The recipient needs the same tool (soft-
ware) and the pass-phrase to unhide the message. Basically, all a terrorist needs
to do is choose a tool, “stego” a message, and e-mail the message to a friend or
post it to a publicly available site. Thereafter, an accomplice can retrieve this
container message using the correct pass-phrase and the same software. Because
steganography is not yet widely known, and technologically viable images are
prolific on the Internet, it is very likely that the result image will go unnoticed as
it reaches its destination.
What if counterterrorism professionals want to know if an image has a mes-
sage hidden in it? Is this a lost cause? With the basic knowledge of steganography
detailed above, should they be suspicious of every image they see? How can they
start to “see” these messages? There are several techniques used to find mes-
sages hidden in container files.
Steganalysis is the art of discovering and rendering useless such covert mes-
sages (Johnson & Jajodia, 1999). To understand how steganalysis locates hidden
messages, it is important to note that hiding information in electronic media
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Color Red Green Blue
Red 255 0 0
Green 0 255 0
Blue 0 0 255
Yellow 255 255 0
White 255 255 255
Black 0 0 0
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alters the media’s fundamental properties. This alteration may ultimately intro-
duce some detectable form of degradation or a pattern of unusual characteristics
that can be detected, either initially or over time as a pattern emerges. These
unusual characteristics act as indicators of covert activity and suggest to analysts
the existence of a hidden message and even the actual software used.
Johnson and Jajodia (1999) noted that counterattacks on and analysis of hid-
den information may take several forms: detecting, extracting, and disabling or
destroying hidden information. As argued so far, the result file of a steganographic
transaction may have some amount of degradation, and this degradation is not
perceptible to the human senses. If this degradation has certain characteristics, it
might point to the existence of a message. Detecting hidden information is com-
plex without knowing which tool was used to create an image and, obviously, the
pass-phrase, or steganographic key. Steganographic tools vary in their approaches
to hiding data, and the technical aspects of all of these techniques are beyond the
scope and intent of this article.
To conduct steganalysis with the intent of uncovering hidden messages, it is
imperative to compare and evaluate many original and result images to cata-
logue the patterns of anomalies they contain. Color composition, luminance,
and pixel relationships must be studied for characteristics that are not normal to
previous images. This process is then used to create a knowledge base from
which decoding may transpire. Three fairly common patterns found from such
analysis include the unusual sorting of color palettes, distortions in the relation-
ships between colors in color indexes, and exaggerated noise profiles. Making
these minute comparisons of multiple images will eventually identify patterns
that may pertain to a particular software tool. Eventually, the analysis (knowl-
edge) base created by this process is large enough to detect the presence of a hid-
den message and/or the software tool used to hide it.
Of course, recurring and thus predictable patterns are not always apparent,
even if distortion is noticeable. Likewise, it would be reasonable to assume that a
technologically savvy terrorist group would avoid detection by randomly chang-
ing software tools and/or steganographic methodologies. Another barrier to
steganalysis is that the hardware, software, and processing time needed to
accomplish the identification task can be overwhelming. When an image is sus-
pect, or when an image is known to contain a message, it may not be possible to
retrieve that hidden message within a time frame acceptable for counterterrorist
purposes.
The alternative is to disable the message and render the hidden information
useless. With each method of hiding information, there is a trade-off between the
size of the payload (the amount of hidden information) that can be embedded
and the survivability, or robustness, of that information to manipulation (John-
son & Jajodia, 1999). It is just this trade-off that offers counterterrorism profes-
sionals the opportunity to disable hidden messages.
Disabling or removing messages in image files comes down to image pro-
cessing techniques. Processing a suspected image using a lossy compression
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technique such as JPEG uses is enough to make the hidden message useless to an
adversary. Another method is to overwrite the area of a file that may contain
noise space useable for message hiding. Here, an agency suspecting a hidden
message overwrites this area with a new message or more likely with heightened
levels of noise.
The developers of steganographic tools and the users of steganalysis tech-
niques are at odds in this cat-and-mouse game. New methods of hiding data will
result in new methods of finding data, and research continues in each area. Sev-
eral conclusions from the discussion of steganography and steganalysis are rele-
vant for counterterrorism professionals:
• Although steganography has been used in various formats for thousands of years,
digital steganography currently has a relatively low visibility to frontline law
enforcement agencies.
• Hiding a message with steganographic methods reduces the chances that the mes-
sage will be detected.
• The best container for hidden messages is an innocuous image, for example, an
image of a cat, a horse, or a car. Terrorists would most likely pick an image that
cannot be compared to an original.
• There are a large number of steganographic tools available both for purchase at
low cost and as freeware.
• These tools are easy to use, and most computer hobbyists would be able to master
them in a relatively short time.
• Methods beyond visual examination are being explored to detect messages hidden
by such software tools.
• Manual examination of every image is impossible given the number of images on
the Internet.
• If counterterrorist professionals want to find a hidden message in an image, they
probably can, given time, technology, and funding. Disabling a message may be
faster but will not provide the same depth of intelligence.
SOCIAL, REGULATORY, AND LEGAL ISSUES
The Internet is a global community, albeit one that simultaneously exists in
multiple locations, cultures, and societies. It is a community with ill-defined and
constantly changing norms of behavior. It also has a structure of limited sanc-
tions for violations of these rules. In traditional social organizations or societies,
sanctions are generally categorized as either formal or informal (Garland,
1990). Informal sanctions are not necessarily codified in legal or regulatory
authorities, and the power to enforce them by and large rests in the interaction
between social actors. In the case of the Internet, informal rules have periodi-
cally been collected and organized into texts for the mass market (Shea, 1994;
Van Der Leun & Mandel, 1996). Similarly, informal calls for good behavior
emerge out of this interactive milieu. Contemporary evidence of this emergent
process can be found on sites related to protecting children from harmful
Internet interactions (Magid, 2001). Even Internet service providers (ISPs) have
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rules that apply to misbehavior, and they enforce these rules as a matter of busi-
ness practice (Yahoo! Inc., 2001). Using these types of socially informal rules,
companies such as Yahoo! and eBay attempt to regulate the content of their Web
sites and oversee the transactions that flow through their portals.
In contrast, formalized norms of behavior are generally codified in legal and
regulatory authorities. As a case in point, in the United States, terrorism is
defined by Title 22, Section 2656f(d) of the U.S. Code and by Title 28, Section
0.85 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Equally noteworthy, the general legal-
istic approach used by counterterrorism agencies in the United States is pre-
sented by the following: “Although various Executive Orders, Presidential
Decision Directives, and congressional statutes address the issue of terrorism,
there is no single federal law specifically making terrorism a crime [italics
added]. Terrorists are arrested and convicted under existing criminal statutes”
(U.S. Department of Justice, 1998, p. i).
In the case of cyberterrorism, such preexisting authorities are currently under
review, and attempts to prosecute or to use them challenge preexisting norms
related to freedom of expression and other civil liberties. The following discus-
sion will help illustrate how difficult enforcement of these legal authorities can
become when the issues of the Internet are enmeshed with counterterrorism
policies.
The efficiency and convenience of the information age is available to law-
abiding citizens and terrorist alike. Issues surrounding cryptography, stegan-
ography, and cyberterrorism exist as part of a technological landscape that
changes with the warp speed of the latest silicon chip. U.S. government efforts to
detect terrorist acts must conform to the requirements of the U.S. Constitution
and federal statutes, many times documents written long before the advent of the
computer.16 The Bill of Rights, for example, went into effect in 1791. Can such a
document, fashioned in the “horse-and-buggy” age, continue to meet the chal-
lenges of the high-speed Internet age? How should the courts and legal systems
respond to Internet-based terrorism threats within the boundaries of First
Amendment free speech guarantees, Fourth Amendment search and seizure
protection, and other individual liberty protections?
One of the key legal and policy issues facing law enforcement is how terror-
ists threaten pubic safety by using commercially available encryption products
to prevent law enforcement from engaging in reasonable searches on the basis of
probable cause of criminal activity (in legal arguments, steganographic tools
would fall within the purview of encryption products). Such encryption devices
allow terrorists to communicate among themselves through a variety of elec-
tronic communication modes while thwarting law enforcement from gathering
evidence of criminal wrongdoing by means of lawful electronic surveillance and
search and seizure (Smith, 2000).
These encryption devices provide security for a vast array of legitimate elec-
tronic communications, including conventional and cellular telephone conver-
sations, fax transmissions, Internet communications (e-mail, etc.), personal
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computers, wireless communications, electronically stored information, remote
keyless entry systems, radio frequency communications systems, advanced
messaging systems, and the like.
The illegitimate use of encryption devices may affect law enforcement in a
number of areas, but this discussion will focus on electronic surveillance and
search and seizure. In the United States, both of these activities must be per-
formed within the boundaries defined by the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth
Amendment’s protection of “the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures” extends
to private communications, just as it does to private things and locations (Katz v.
United States, 1967). The definition of a search is the same for the surveillance
of communications as it is for visual and physical searches: It includes activities
that either physically intrude into a protected location or violate a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The surreptitious use of an interception device for sur-
veillance purposes always intrudes on a reasonable expectation of privacy and
always amounts to a search.
The federal statutes governing the use of wiretaps require a judicial intercep-
tion court order authorizing the operation after a showing that specific commu-
nications are being used in furtherance of serious criminal activity and that nor-
mal investigative procedures have been tried and failed or reasonably appear to
be unsuccessful or too dangerous (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,
Title III, 1968; 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c), 1994; United States v. Giordano, 1974).
Only after a court order is issued can law enforcement use a device to intercept
oral communications, wire communications, and electronic communications
related to serious criminal activity (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act, Title III, 1968).
As noted, encryption is now commonly used to protect various types of elec-
tronic communications, from e-mail to data on computer hard drives. Once an
interception order for electronic surveillance is issued, law enforcement is faced
with the hurdle of decryption that hinders the effective execution of that order.
Recently, policies designed to address these issues have been passed. For exam-
ple, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 man-
dates that new telecommunications switching equipment be wiretap ready.
Encryption devices also affect searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment. More and more criminally related material is being stored on hard
drives, floppy disks, and various other electronic devices. Such electronic hard-
ware is increasingly the subject of Fourth Amendment searches and seizures
and, as noted, increasingly protected by encryption.
These encrypted materials from criminal activities provide a curious legal
challenge. Unlike intelligence gathering aimed at global sources of terrorism
and performed, for example, by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), state
and federal law enforcement activities are aimed at gathering criminal evidence
that will sustain a prosecution and conviction in open court. Under the Sixth
Amendment, a defendant has the right of access to evidence and the right to
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cross-examine witnesses who testify against him or her. Because of the need to
safeguard techniques and technologies, all of the particular methods used by the
intelligence community to decode encrypted data may not be available to local
law enforcement. Law enforcement officials understand that if indeed the infor-
mation and techniques are shared, the evidence gathering process is subject to
exposure in open court.
The challenge for law enforcement is to have commercially available encryp-
tion devices that encompass some technical means that would allow plain-text
access, pursuant to a judicial interception court order, to encrypted electronic
communications related to terrorists’ actions or encrypted computer files law-
fully seized under a search warrant (Smith, 2000). In this manner, the safe-
guarded techniques used by intelligence agencies will remain secure, and local
law enforcement agencies can proceed with their investigations.
Encryption, like steganography, works by applying a mathematical function
called an algorithm to scramble data and other communications. The algorithm
used to unscramble, or decrypt, the information is generally called the decryp-
tion key. Several options that allow local law enforcement access (also known as
a back door) are available. Key recovery allows immediate access to the plain
text of encrypted data, and key escrow is an encryption system that provides
access to encrypted data through special data recovery keys (Smith, 2000).
Both key recovery and key escrow are basically software solutions to the
problem of access to encrypted information. In addition, back doors can be hard-
wired into the very structure of the Internet. Cisco Systems has developed a
“clear zone” within computer routers it sells to ISPs. With this hardware in
place, law enforcement can go to a system administrator armed with a search
warrant and receive the plain text of the encrypted electronic communications
that are the subject matter of the warrant (Smith, 2000).
More problematic for law enforcement is the use of “end-to-end” encryption
devices that bypass ISPs and, for example, can be attached to any phone in the
world. If a coconspirator has a similar device with the proper code to decrypt, the
resulting conversations are encrypted end to end. Although such communica-
tions may be intercepted, they cannot necessarily be decrypted easily because
the encryption hardware is in a nonrecoverable format (Smith, 2000).
There are few contemporary statutory restrictions on domestic encryption
products. The only restrictions on encryption products are the export controls
designed to protect national security interests and the federal government under
the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (1999), established to implement
the provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979.
American courts are divided over whether regulating the export of encryption
products is a violation of the law. Three cases show the split in judicial thinking.
In Karn v. United States Department of State (1996), the plaintiff argued that the
U.S. Department of State’s regulation of two disks containing encryption source
code was a violation of his free speech protection under the First Amendment.
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The federal district court rejected Karn’s First Amendment claim and based
its decision on the government’s need to regulate items that have national secu-
rity implications. The court held that the regulation of the two disks was content
neutral and within the regulatory power of the federal government as long as
other conditions were met. The additional conditions included “whether the reg-
ulation is (1) ‘within the constitutional power of the government, (2) furthers an
important or substantial government interest,’ and (3) is narrowly tailored to the
government interest” (Karn v. United States Department of State, 1996, p. 10).
The controlling test that the court used is found in United States v. O’Brien
(1968), in which the Supreme Court held that laws prohibiting conduct may be
applied to persons engaged in speech when the laws serve a substantial govern-
ment interest that is not related to suppressing a speaker’s message. The disks in
Karn v. United States Department of State (1996) passed the O’Brien test
because of the national security interest in regulating products that might harm
the United States.
In the next case, Bernstein v. United States Department of State (1999), the
plaintiff argued that encryption regulations violated his First Amendment rights
by limiting his freedom to teach, publish, or discuss with other scientists his
encryption research. In the initial case, the district court held that source code is
speech for First Amendment purposes. In the second hearing, the district court
ruled that particular government regulations were unconstitutional prior restraints
on free speech under the First Amendment. The court extended its rationale to
the new EAR regulations in the third hearing.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed Bernstein’s case and
affirmed the lower court’s finding that certain EAR regulations violate the First
Amendment. The court found that source code is expressive language for First
Amendment purposes. The court asserted that source code serves the same
expressive function for programmers as equations do for mathematicians or
graphs do for economists. The court acknowledged that the government might
impose certain restrictions on materials that are content neutral, narrowly tai-
lored, and leave open different channels for interaction.
Having previously determined in prior decisions that source code constitutes
expressive activity, the court held that the encryption regulations were an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment. In 1999, the Ninth
Circuit Court voted to withdraw the three-judge panel opinion and rehear the
case by the en banc court. In 2000, the court decided to remand the case to the
district court in light of new encryption regulations adopted on January 14,
2000.
Although the opinion discussed above is no longer the law, it is relevant in
light of the struggle over encryption export regulation because the issues of First
Amendment rights related to such codes are as yet unresolved. The third case of
the triumvirate, Junger v. Daly (1998/2000), illustrates this point. Junger, the
plaintiff and a law professor, claimed that the export regulations violated his
First Amendment right to free speech. The federal district court found that
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encryption software is functional rather than expressive; that the encryption
source code is exported to transfer functions, not to communicate ideas. There-
fore, the source code is not expressive under the First Amendment. The court
reasoned that although exporting source code occasionally has communicative
elements, that remains insufficient to extend First Amendment protections. The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found that because
computer source code is an expressive means for the exchange of information
and ideas about computer programming, the First Amendment protects it. The
case was remanded back to the district court to consider whether national secu-
rity interests should outweigh the interests in allowing the free exchange of
encryption source code.
All three cases highlight the difficulty the courts have in applying the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment analysis, set forth in the United States v.
O’Brien (1968) test, to a complex technological problem. Encryption source
code does not fit neatly under the traditional First Amendment categories of the
written or spoken word, because it can be both expressive and functional. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has consistently held that First Amendment protection
can extend to certain types of conduct or “symbolic speech,” as it did in the
O’Brien case.
Proponents of restrictions on the export of encryption, such as the federal
government, law enforcement agencies, and the military, see encryption as a
threat to national security. Some even favor regulation of domestic encryption,
such as requiring people to automatically make copies of their encryption keys
for deposit with the government or a designated third party. Law enforcement
officials believe that the widespread availability of nonrecoverable encryption
would severely impair their ability to fight crime and terrorism (McClure,
2000).
The First Amendment is also implicated when terrorists use the Internet to
communicate criminal conspiracies among themselves. Although the free speech
protection provided by the First Amendment may be the crown jewel of Ameri-
can democracy and civil liberties, courts will not allow terrorists to indiscrimi-
nately hide behind the First Amendment shield.
In Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment protects the right to advocate violence and other unlawful acts
unless the advocacy is both directed toward inciting or producing imminent law-
less action and likely to incite or produce such action. In United States v. Barnett
(1982), the defendant claimed First Amendment protection for his printed
instructions for the manufacture of PCP and other illegal drugs. Calling the
defendant’s argument “specious,” the Ninth Circuit Court explained that the
First Amendment did not provide a defense to a criminal charge in which the
provider of information used only words to carry out his illegal purpose. The
court stated that it was not necessary for the government to show that there was a
personal meeting between the defendant and the drug manufacturer to prove the
offense of aiding and abetting.
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In United States v. Mendelsohn (1990), the court was also unwilling to extend
First Amendment protection from aiding and abetting to computer software.
Makers of computer software containing a bookmaking program claimed a First
Amendment defense. The Ninth Circuit Court discussed the need for evidence
showing that the speech involved was merely a form of communication that was
distant from an immediate connection to the criminal act. Although computer
programs receive First Amendment protection under other circumstances, the
court believed the bookmaking program was so intimately connected with the
execution of a criminal act (i.e., copyright infringement) that there was no enti-
tlement to First Amendment protection. The First Amendment defense was not
allowed when the words were more than mere advocacy but functioned as facili-
tating the actual crime.
In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises (1997/1998), relatives and representatives of
three murder victims filed suit against Paladin Enterprises, the publisher of the
book Hit Man. This book contains 130 pages of detailed instructions on how to
commit a murder and how to become a “hit man” for hire. James Perry took the
instructions to heart and murdered a woman, her quadriplegic son, and the son’s
nurse. The woman’s ex-husband hired Perry to murder the family so that he
could receive a $2 million settlement the son had received as a result of the acci-
dent in which he became paralyzed.
Although the lower district court held that the First Amendment protected
Paladin Enterprises’publication of Hit Man, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed this decision and held that the First Amendment did not prevent the
finding that Paladin aided and abetted in the criminal act carried out by Perry.
Additionally, the court noted that the Department of Justice had advised Con-
gress that Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) could not prevent the punishment of
speech that involved aiding and abetting. According to the court, the text within
Hit Man functioned as the preparation of a group of people for violent action and
the encouragement of that action. The court concluded that someone could
incite imminent lawless action not only through a call to action but also through
speech that although advocating nothing, functioned as an instruction book for
committing crimes.
There are a variety of difficult technological and legal issues facing law
enforcement as it combats cyberterrorism. The law defined through court deci-
sions and statutes is emerging as it responds to these new technological develop-
ments. Nevertheless, in America, the Bill of Rights continues to be the most via-
ble framework within which the government, performing the delicate balancing
of individual liberties and national security, battles threats of terrorism. Just as
this country has wrestled with legal issues related to cyberterrorism, so have and
so will other democracies. Many experts believe that one of the best cures for
such debates are hard facts and empirical data on the extent of the problem. The
next section grapples with this issue and offers a framework with which such
data could be collected.
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SUMMARY AND ANALYTICAL TYPOLOGY
As noted above, counterterrorism professionals have recently been faced
with the reality of terrorists using advanced technology to hide their communi-
cations from prying eyes (Tenet, 2001). The prospect that terrorist organizations
or in fact any group that could potentially evolve into a violent political move-
ment could be using the Internet to advance their cause is not science fiction but
reality. The reality is also that counterterrorism agencies are not organization-
ally prepared to defend against such advances in technology (Arquilla &
Ronfeldt, 1996; Myers & Beatty, 2001). In fact and to date, discussions of
cyberterrorism have not necessarily included digital steganography or many
other forms of technological criminality as one of the terrorist forms that need to
be addressed in policy or practice.
This section concludes the article with an administrative schema that may
help organize the various cyberterrorism-related incidents that have already
transpired and will continue to transpire. In this way, the actual frequency of
events will start to become documented, the scope of the problem can be mea-
sured across time, and these empirical data can then be used to rationally inform
policies designed to minimize the effects of cyberterrorism, even those varieties
that have yet to be identified.
Using a similar approach to the construction of a database as that used by
well-known terrorism and incident tracking typologies, we suggest that a sec-
ondary source–based analytical methodology be adopted. When researching the
proposed cyberincident typology detailed below, we consulted various preexist-
ing sources such as the RAND Chronology of Terrorism Incidents, the U.S.
Department of Energy’s Safeguards Summary Events List, and organizational
structures used by private security industry databases from such companies as
Risks International (Ballard 1997; Fowler, 1981; Hoffman & Hoffman, 1996).
The discussion herein focuses on three key areas: what variables are needed to
track this form of terrorism, what selection criteria should be used for the sec-
ondary sources, and what categories could be used to facilitate this data collec-
tion and organization activity.
Variables that are selected to help track incidents of cyberterrorism should be
articulated prior to any collection of data, and several are suggested below. All
terrorist incidents encoded within the proposed data set should be categorized
by use of a range of variables that will allow for relational analysis between the
incidents. Each incident should be categorized by date, and each entry should
include various data classifications commonly associated with terrorism research
and cyberterrorism attacks. The following list of variables may be helpful in
defining a data set: type of action or incident; tactics used; economic impact;
fatalities involved; injuries that transpired; target of the attack by category;
agency charged with preventing the attack; legal authorities violated during inci-
dent; nationality or race of targets; country where the attack transpired; country
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where the attack originated; characteristics of perpetrators; characteristics of
victims; media source where data were gathered, actual and by category; verifi-
cation of media sources by use of secondary reports; political or social motiva-
tion behind the attack; where support for the actions originated; technological
platform; and other variables identified by experts. Updates to this list of vari-
ables should be made on a periodic and scheduled basis. Likewise, as to the
actual incidents used as the data for such a typology, they must also be reviewed
on a periodic and systematic basis because the initial reporting of the incident
may contain inaccuracies, and the investigative facts can change over time.
Selecting which incidents to include in the database may be the most signifi-
cant error-reducing, or error-introducing, decision facing researchers. To over-
come the nationalistic myopia that infuses some data sets, the proposed database
should include incidents of both a domestic (globally defined)17 and an interna-
tional nature. These include incidents in which the attackers were citizens of the
country where the attack transpired and/or incidents in which attackers went
beyond their national borders to perpetuate the attack, selected target victims
with connections to a foreign state, or attacked infrastructure facilities in such a
manner as to create an international incident.
Publicly available media sources that are chosen to supply the data entry pro-
cess will likewise influence the quality of the data to be classified in the
typology. The RAND Chronology of Terrorism Incidents uses publicly available
sources such as newspaper reports. Although this choice may have been a good
idea in the 1970s, when cyberculture was nonexistent, contemporary cybersociety
demands a more inclusive methodology to locate acceptable information sources.
Because cyberculture may well be reported, if not transpire, in a different
medium, researchers should consider the need to open up the sources and possi-
bly include underground Web sites, alternative and developmental technology
reporting sources, and other sites where technological advancements and illus-
trative incidents may be reported while being missed by mainstream media out-
lets such as newspapers.
Given the many suggestions and limitations noted herein, it is reasonable to
assume that the task of constructing a typology would be difficult, expensive,
and time consuming. Next, we offer one typology designed to ignite the dia-
logue on what would be an effective methodology to study cyberterrorism. Any-
one wishing to actually construct a working typology and start the collection of
data in a systematic and longitudinal research effort may find this effort a mere
starting point.
This typology has defined four categories and various subcategories from
which a more detailed analysis could transpire. These four categories are infor-
mation attacks, infrastructure attacks, technological facilitation of attacks, and
fund raising and promotion of causes. Table 2 delineates these four categories,
offers a definition of each, and coupled with the discussion below, suggests how
various contemporary incidents could be incorporated within this analytical
structure.
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Maybe the most commonly recognized form of cyberterrorism is the infor-
mation attack, which can be defined as an attack focused on altering or destroy-
ing the content of electronic files, computer systems, or the various materials
therein. Reporters, scholars, and counterterrorism professionals seem to focus
on these activities not necessarily because of their potential for damage but
rather because they are the most visible and widely reported events. Many indi-
vidualized cases of online harassment, identity theft, online threats to schools,
use of computer viruses, denial of service incidents, and other activities have
been described as cyberterrorism (Associated Press, 2001; DiDio, 1998; Frazier,
2001a; Kwang, 2001; Lieberman, 2000). Considering the definitions of terror-
ism and how easily the label is appropriated by anyone wishing to vilify others,
these assorted activities may have been categorized as cyberterrorism more out
of ignorance than as a social scientific–based mythological application of opera-
tional definitions.
Researchers need to determine if the incidents thus classified actually repre-
sent cyberterrorism or if they would better be addressed as civil and legal mat-
ters. The primary consideration should be their motivation or intent. In many
cases, the incidents commonly referred to as cyberterrorism may not reach this
threshold simply because the intent or motivation was not social or political in
nature. This observation supports the perspective of various commentators who
have noted that many of the attacks being called cyberterrorism are nothing
more than defacements and minor annoyances (Allen, Meserve, & Arena, 2001;
Hunker, 2000).
The second form of cyberterrorism involves those attacks directed at seri-
ously disrupting or destroying infrastructure. This includes attacks on the actual
hardware, operating platforms, or programming in a computerized environ-
ment. Here, the effect of the attack may damage data, but the intent is more
directed at destroying the systems, or any system, that control the data or
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TABLE 2: Cyberincident Typology
Category Definition or Explanation
Information
attacks
Cyberterrorist attacks focused on altering or destroying the content of
electronic files, computer systems, or the various materials therein.
Infrastructure
attacks
Cyberterrorist attacks designed to disrupt or destroy the actual
hardware, operating platform, or programming in a computerized
environment.
Technological
facilitation
Use of cybercommunications to send plans for terrorist attacks, incite
attacks, or otherwise facilitate traditional terrorism or
cyberterrorism.
Fund raising and
promotion
Use of the Internet to raise funds for a violent political cause, to
advance an organization supportive of violent political action, or to
promote an alternative ideology that is violent in orientation.
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computerized environment (Barger, 1996; Spiegel, 2001). Although some over-
lap exists with the first category, once again, incidents included herein should
represent evidence that an attack had a larger purpose and intent.
Recent Web attacks between private citizens in the United States and China
serve as illustrations. Hackers from both sides attacked information and infra-
structure sites in the other country during a time of heightened political tension.
These attacks focused on government Web sites, electric grid controls, and
Internet service portals (Frazier, 2001b; Kwang, 2001). The reports indicate that
what started as a data attack, or hacking, quickly escalated into a potentially
more serious series of attacks. These follow-up infrastructure attacks had a far
greater potential for social harm and economic impact than the original hacking.
The third category of cyberterrorism is not an attack per se but rather the use
of the Internet to facilitate traditional terrorism or cyberterrorism. As noted in
the section on steganography, this emerging trend is worrisome to counterterrorism
professionals (Lesce, 1999). Louis Freeh, while still the director of the FBI,
noted, “uncrackable encryption is allowing terrorists to communicate without
fear of outside intrusion” (quoted in Kelley, 2001a, p. 7A). The CIA and the FBI
agree that terrorists are using these technologies to facilitate planning and to dis-
seminate information on how to conduct terrorist attacks (Kelley, 2001b, 2001c,
2001d; Sloan, 2001; Tenet, 2001). The encryption of messages, the use of
steganography to hide plans, file sharing of information on how to plan attacks,
the dissemination of information on violence rationales, and Web sites provid-
ing bombing information are just a few of the ways the Internet can be used to
facilitate attacks.
The final category in the cyberincident typology reflects uses of the Internet
to raise funds for a violent political cause, advance an organization supportive of
violent political action, or to promote an alternative ideology that is violent in
orientation. For example, many alternative political organizations, which may
or may not support terrorism, have Internet presences (Grier, 2001; Piller, 2001;
Roy, 2001). These commentators have suggested that these types of activities
equate to the creation of virtual states, and these cybercountries could promote
terrorism in both the real and virtual worlds. Likewise, incitements to violence
and fund raising by alternative political organizations have the potential to offer
justifications and financial support to terrorist attacks (Appel, 2001; Schlosberg,
2001). Although these activities do not necessarily reflect overt cyberterrorism,
they do represent tacit planning and support. They should be considered impor-
tant investigative facts when trying to affix a location for responsibility and ulti-
mately for sanctions ex post facto to the incident.
Hoffman (2001), commenting on terrorism in general, noted that the collec-
tion of data may not be enough to counter cyberterrorists. Hoffman does support
the idea of systematic terrorism research when stating that “an essential prereq-
uisite to ensuring that our formidable resources are focused where they can have
the most effect is a sober and empirical understanding of the threat coupled with
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a clear, comprehensive and coherent strategy” (p. 8). The lesson Hoffman was
trying to impart is thatdatacollection isnot thebe-all andend-allofcounterterrorism.
Although the details above suggest the need for social scientific–based
operationalization and systematic construction of an analytical typology to
facilitate an empirical understanding, we agree with counterterrorism profes-
sionals and government reports that suggest that this effort will not be enough
(Hoffman, 2001; U.S. General Accounting Offce, 2001). As suggested by these
advocates, agencies interested in cyberterrorism need to pursue a coordinated
and structured data collection and analysis process. These efforts need to be aug-
mented by policies and laws designed to reduce the risk of attacks. In a similar
fashion, researchers have noted that as a matter of economic survival, private
business should also be involved in these efforts (Bridis, 2001).
Documenting and categorizing incidents, conducting longitudinal analysis
of the scope of the problem and trends therein, and informing directed and coor-
dinated cyberterrorism policies would not be enough to stop cyberterrorism. A
comprehensive analysis of the cyberthreat should dovetail with a comprehensive
national and international counterterrorism policy. Hoffman (2001) recently testi-
fied before Congress on the general terrorism threat and said,
an effective counter terrorism policy is, however, no longer the question of more
attention, bigger budgets and increased staffing that it once was: but of a need for
greater focus, a better appreciation of the problem and firmer understanding of the
threat. (p. 1)
The collection and analysis of data are important to assessing the risks and
can provide a better appreciation of the issues. As demonstrated herein, those
issues may be hard to define, have yet to be addressed in a legalistic manner, and
can change as technology develops. Data sets can only act as guides for policy
makers and counterterrorism professionals. Research, although important, is
not a replacement for consistent and persistent vigilance by lawmakers, agency
managers, and policy elites charged with countering the threats of terrorism. The
data set managers who will run a cyberterrorism typology need this same level of
vigilance to overcome the rapid changes in their analysis environment, to iden-
tify changes in the tactics used by those they study, and to help inform changes in
the policy responses necessary to counteract cyberterrorism threats.
NOTES
1. Currently, the RAND organization continues to study terrorism, and several of its research
fellows are focusing on netwar, their term for various activities including Internet-related acts of
political opposition (Ronfelt, Arquilla, Fuller, & Fuller, 1998).
2. This definition includes the legalistic and definitional perspective generally promoted by the
FBI.
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3. References are given to document the history and technical aspects of cryptography,
steganography, and watermarking. The discussion that follows was written for lay readers and
designed to help them understand this technology.
4. Digital watermarking is also commonly used to describe the process of hiding information or
security systems in a sound or image file.
5. As the casual reader will note, the lines of technological distinction between cryptography,
steganography, and watermarking are not exactly clear. Likewise, legal authorities are having diffi-
culty distinguishing these techniques from one another when enacting policies, and they generally
legislate against encryption as a single technological method rather than against individual technologies.
6. Developments in digital watermarking or the legitimate hiding of verification information in
the recording of music help illustrate several issues not discussed here. One recent challenge
between a trade industry organization and Princeton researchers looking to hack into their “safely”
guarded information is illustrative (“The RIAA’s Low Watermark,” 2001). Using reverse engineer-
ing techniques, the researchers were able to defeat the industry security systems. The point of this
example is that technological innovations are open to misuse and abuse almost as quickly as prod-
ucts can be distributed by manufactures.
7. Bits and bytes are the basic building blocks of digital and computerized communications.
Bits are a subset of bytes.
8. This technology does not work on every type of file one would encounter in a computerized
environment.
9. Although the techniques are similar for audio and image files, the focus from here on will be
on image files. Audio files will be mentioned only when relevant.
10. The GIF (graphics interchange format) format is commonly used to upload documents to the
CompuServe Information Service and to pass files onto other types of computers. This highly com-
pressed format, using Lempel-Ziv-Welsh compression, is designed to minimize file transfer times
over phone lines. The GIF format supports only color-mapped images with fewer than eight bits.
Although, not the most economical format available, GIF is the most common file format found on
the Internet.
11. BMP (bitmap) is a file format commonly used on IBM-compatible PCs. BMP files can also
refer to the IBM OS/2 bitmap format, which is a strict superset of the Microsoft Windows format.
12. Other techniques (e.g., direct sequence, frequency hopping, spread spectrum, etc.) represent
major watermark embedding methods. These methods modify the noise value of a container. The
direct-sequence technique adds noise to every element of a container. The frequency-hopping
method selects a pseudorandom subset of a container’s data to be watermarked (Zhao, Koch, & Luo,
1998).
13. For an excellent and comprehensive resource on cryptography, steganography, and watermarking,
see Anderson and Petitcolas (1999).
14 JPEG (from Joint Photographic Experts Group) is a 24-bit graphic format. JPEG compres-
sion economizes the way data is stored and also identifies and discards “extra” data, that is, beyond
what the human eye can see. Because the JPEG format discards data, the JPEG algorithm is referred
to as lossy. This means that once a file is compressed and then decompressed, the result will not be
identical to the original image. In most instances, the difference in an image is not distinguishable
from the original.
15. Experts on steganography note that an image with large areas of solid colors is a poor choice
because variations created from an embedded message will be more noticeable (Johnson, 1999).
16. The use of the United States as an example of the legal challenges posed by cyberterrorism
reflects the fact that this country has a well-documented and ongoing legal debate on these subjects.
Likewise, other countries are also engaging in similar legal debates, albeit with focuses on different
civil liberty issues.
17. Incident tracking typologies often do not include these types of domestic events. This is a
vestige of the era when terrorism was thought of as a threat only from abroad and not necessarily an
internal problem. Events such as the Oklahoma City bombing forced researchers to recognize this as
a problem and reconsider this operational choice.
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